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COVID-19 and Quantitative Literacy: Focusing on Probability
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic is arguably the worst crisis the world has faced, so far, in this new century. We
haven’t seen a pandemic like this since the 1918 Flu at the beginning of the last century, and, as of this
writing, there appears to be no end in sight. What those of us who’re focused on quantitative methods
have noticed, in addition to the many people dying, becoming ill, and losing their livelihoods, is the
importance of quantitative literacy to an understanding of what’s going on. That’s what this article is
about. Specifically, it’s about how the COVID-19 pandemic is illustrating the importance of understanding
different aspects of probability theory, particularly conditional probability.
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Lewis: Covid-19 and Probability

Introduction
One of the things the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic makes clear is the importance
of quantitative literacy. Irfan points this out in a very informative recent piece on
the disease (2020). For example, if a nation’s residents are to take seriously public
health experts’ call for social distancing, it might help if they have a basic
understanding of exponential growth. Irfan’s article is meant to help provide that
understanding. Not only does the COVID-19 pandemic provide a mathematics
lesson on exponential growth; it also provides one on probability.
For one thing, not all people exposed to the virus end up getting infected;
instead, there is some non-zero probability that they’ll become infected. Also, if a
person becomes infected with COVID-19, they won’t necessarily die from it;
instead, there is some non-zero chance that they will. In fact, the chance that
someone will die from COVID-19, given that they’ve been infected, is an example
of a special type of probability called a conditional probability.
Generally, a conditional probability is the probability that one thing happens,
given that something else has happened. Another example of a conditional
probability is the chance that someone ends up being hospitalized with COVID-19,
given that they’ve been infected. Yet a third example, is the probability that
someone ends up on a ventilator, given that they’ve been hospitalized.
It should be clear from these examples that exponential growth isn’t all there
is to pandemics such as COVID-19; probabilities are just as relevant. Therefore,
understanding probabilities is key to understanding this pandemic, as well as related
matters, such as diagnostic testing. The rest of this paper elaborates on these points.

What Is Probability?
Even though the term probability is often used, there’s disagreement on what it
means (Hacking 2001; McGrayne 2011). To some, probability is a relative
frequency or, more formally, the limit of a relative frequency (Von Mises 1957).
That is, probability for these folks is thought of as
no. of times some event occurs
no. of times the event could possibly occur

or the number this fraction approaches as the number of times the event in question
could occur approaches infinity.
To others, probability is degree of belief in a proposition about the occurrence
of some event (Savage 1972). Suppose we consider the proposition “more people
will die from the current COVID-19 pandemic than died during the Spanish flu
pandemic of the early 20th century.” Assume that one person says that there is a
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20% chance that this statement is true, while a second person claims that this chance
is 50%. The second person believes in this proposition to a greater degree than does
the first one.
Even though there are disagreements about what probability means,
mathematicians and statisticians widely agree on how probabilities must behave
mathematically. Based on work by Andrey Kolmogorov (1956), mathematicians
now define probability in terms certain axioms and are able to prove various
theorems about probabilities on the basis of these axioms. This more mathematical
treatment applies whether one thinks of probabilities as relative frequencies or
degrees of belief.
An important distinction, relevant to this paper, that mathematicians make is
between unconditional and conditional probabilities. Let P(A) stand for the
probability that event A occurs and P(A│B) stand for the probability that event A
occurs, given that another event B also occurs. Then P(A) would be the
unconditional probability of A and P(A│B) would be the conditional probability of
A, that is the probability of A conditional on the occurrence of B. By using “event
language,” for the purposes of this paper, I’m coming down on the side of the
relative frequentist interpretation of probability (Hacking 2001). That is because
for the examples I’ll use later, it’s most natural to discuss them in terms of that
interpretation.
Expressed as fraction, P(A) is
no. of times event A occurs
no. of times event A could possibly occur

and P(A│B) is
no. of times event 𝐴 occurs
no. of times event 𝐴 could possibly occur, given that 𝐵 has occured

With these preliminaries out of the way, let’s turn to how COVID-19 provides
lessons in probability theory.

Probability, the Case Fatality Ratio, and the
Infection Fatality Ratio
As of April 13, 2020, there were 554,849 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the U.S.
and 21,942 deaths from the disease (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
[CDC] 2020a). In the language of probability theory, a death from COVID-19 is an
event of interest. The 554,849 confirmed cases of COVID-19 are the number of
deaths, up to that time, that could have occurred, so we can estimate the probability
of dying from the disease conditional on being diagnosed as
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21,942
554,849

= about 0.04 or 4%

Based on these data, if someone in the United States is diagnosed with the disease,
they have about a 4% chance of dying from it. Epidemiologists call this particular
probability the case fatality ratio (CFR).
When it comes to estimating how deadly a disease like COVID-19 is, the CFR
suffers from a serious problem. For one thing, the actual number of COVID-19
cases, as well as the number of deaths from COVID-19, are likely to be
underestimated (CDC 2020b; Howard 2020). An underestimate of the true number
of COVID-19 cases means that the denominator of COVID-19’s CFR is larger than
we think. For a given value of the numerator, a larger denominator means that
COVID-19’s CFR is actually smaller than we think. That is, COVID-19 isn’t
actually as deadly as it appears. An underestimate of the number of deaths from
COVID-19 means that the numerator is higher than we think. For a given value of
the denominator, a large numerator means that COVID-19’s CFR is actually larger
than we think, so COVID-19 is more deadly than it appears to be.
A key reason we might be underestimating the denominator of COVID-19’s
CFR has to do with testing. In order to get diagnosed with COVID-19 and,
therefore, become part of the denominator of the CFR, one has to test positive for
the condition, and of course, to test positive, one must first be tested. A number of
people infected with the virus are mild or asymptomatic cases, which often means
that they don’t get tested. Since they don’t get tested, they can’t become part of the
CFR denominator, and therefore, the denominator of COVID-19 appears smaller
than it actually is (CDC 2020b).
The reason we may be underestimating COVID-19 deaths is, in part, also
related to testing. Some people who died from COVID-19 weren’t recorded as
having done so because they died at home and, therefore, were never tested and
diagnosed with the disease. Others who died in hospitals from COVID-19 were
recorded as having died from something else. Also, there is often a lag time between
the point at which someone dies from COVID-19 and the point at which their death
is recorded as such. So, at any given point in time, there may be people who died
from COVID-19 but who don’t appear in the numerator of the CFR because those
deaths haven’t been recorded yet.
Even though we may be underestimating both the number of cases, as well as
the number of deaths, there is reason to believe that the underestimate of the number
of cases is much larger than the underestimate of the number of deaths. According
to Weinberger et al. (2020), COVID-19 deaths may be 28% higher that the number
of recorded deaths. Havers et al. (2020) tell us that some areas underestimated the
number of COVID-19 cases by as low as a factor of 6, while others did so by as
high a factor of 24. Since the underestimate of cases appears to be much higher than
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the underestimate of deaths, the CFR is likely overestimating how deadly the
disease is.
To get a sense of how large this overestimate might be, let’s increase the
number of deaths in the numerator of our earlier CFR calculation by 28% and our
denominator by a factor of 6:
21,942∗(1.28)
554,849∗(6)

= about 0.008 or 0.8%

Recall that the CFR was about 0.04 or 4%. The calculation directly above results
in a much lower fatality rate of 0.8%. Since this fatality rate is based on the
estimated number of actual infections, rather than the number of diagnosed cases,
it’s called the Infection Fatality Ratio.

Probability and COVID-19 Testing
As I said earlier, asymptomatic or mild cases of COVID-19, because they’re not
tested, may escape diagnosis. Obviously, the main reason we want to test people is
to see if they have the disease. However, the probability that someone actually has
COVID-19, given that they’ve tested positive for it depends on the sensitivity of
the test, the specificity of the test, and the prevalence of the disease.
The sensitivity of a test is the probability that a person tests positive, given that
they have the disease, while the specificity is the probability that they test negative,
given that they are not infected. That is, the sensitivity and specificity of diagnostic
tests are defined in terms of conditional probabilities. The prevalence of a disease
is the overall proportion of the population which has it; it can be thought of as the
probability that someone in the population has the disease.
The main problems with any diagnostic test are false positives and false
negatives. Regarding COVID-19, a false positive would occur if someone without
the disease tested positive for it; a false negative would occur if someone with the
disease tested negative. I mentioned earlier that the probability that someone has
COVID-19, given that they’ve tested positive for it depends on test sensitivity and
specificity, as well as the disease’s prevalence. This can be shown using a theorem
from probability theory called Bayes’ theorem.
Bayes’ theorem takes the following form:
P(A│B)

=

𝑃(𝐵│𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)

and
P(B) = P(B│A)*P(A) + P(B│-A)*P(-A)
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where -A stands for the probability that A does not occur. In Bayes’ theorem, P(A)
is sometimes called the base rate. Let’s rewrite Bayes’ theorem using the relevant
probabilities for COVID-19 testing:
P(COVID-19│Positive) =
𝑃(Positive│COVID‐ 19) ∗ P(COVID‐ 19)
𝑃(Positive│COVID‐ 19) ∗ 𝑃(COVID‐ 19) + 𝑃(Positive│No COVID‐ 19) ∗ 𝑃(No COVID‐ 19)

Within this context, P(Positive│COVID-19) is the sensitivity of the test,
P(COVID-19) is the prevalence of the disease, and P(Positive│No COVID-19) is
the probability of a false positive. P(Positive│No COVID-19) is also equal to 1
minus the specificity of the test. P(COVID│Positive) is the probability that
someone has COVID-19, given that they’ve tested positive for it; it’s also called
the positive predictive value (PPV) of the test. See Boersma and Willard (2008) for
further discussion of the relevance of probability theory to medical testing.).
I don’t know the actual figures for the sensitivity and specificity of COVID-19
tests; no doubt, these will vary depending on the particular tests we’re talking about.
The point I want to make, however, applies to any COVID-19 test, so it’s fine for
me to use hypothetical numbers.
Suppose we have a test with a sensitivity and specificity of 99%. Since the
probability of a false positive is 1 minus the specificity of the test, which in this
case is 1 minus 0.99, the probability of a false positive is 0.01 or 1%. Suppose also,
for the sake of discussion, that the number of actually infected cases is 554,849.
The prevalence of COVID-19 could then be estimated by dividing 554,849 by the
total US population of 329.4 million. That would come out to about 0.17%. We can
now fill in Bayes’ theorem:
P(COVID‐19│Positive)

=

0.99∗0.0017
(0.99∗0.002+ 0.01∗0.9983)

= 0.14

So the chance that someone who tested positive actually has the illness would only
be about 14%.
Suppose we assume that the 554,849 figure underestimates the number of
COVID-19 cases and that, in fact, there are 6,588,000 cases. The prevalence would
then be 6,588,000/329.4 million or 2%. This implies that the probability of someone
not being infected would decrease to 98%. Now Bayes’ theorem would look like
this:
P(COVID‐19│Positive)
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We see that there would now be a much greater chance (67%) that someone who
tested positive for COVID-19 actually has the disease.
Now suppose we assume that 55,998,000 people in the United States currently
have COVID-19, bringing prevalence up to about 17% and the probability of
someone not having it down to about 83%. Bayes’ theorem would now be:
P(COVID‐19│Positive)

=

0.99∗0.17
(0.99∗0.17+ 0.01∗0.83)

= 0.95

With a prevalence this high, 95 out of every 100 people who tested positive for
COVID-19 would actually have it.
Since sensitivity, specificity (indirectly as the probability of a false positive),
and prevalence all appear in Bayes’ theorem, we see how the PPV of a COVID-19
test (or any diagnostic test) depends on these three quantities. But a key takeaway
from these calculations is that the PPV depends heavily on how prevalence is
related to the chance of a false positive. If prevalence is less than the chance of a
false positive, the PPV of a test will be relatively low. But if prevalence is greater
than the probability of a false positive, PPV will be relatively high.
The negative predictive value (NPV) of a test is the probability that someone
who tested negative actually doesn’t have the disease or, if it’s an antibody test,
doesn’t have antibodies to it. It can be shown that if the prevalence of a disease is
less than the probability of a false positive, the NPV of the test will be relatively
high. But if prevalence is greater than the chance of a false positive, the NPV of the
test will be relatively low.
In the midst of a deadly global pandemic, one could ask which is more
important: the PPV or NPV of a test. This moves us into the realm of decision
making. When schools, businesses, and other organizations reopen, some of them
will probably, in an effort to keep their employees and clients/consumers safe,
implement some type of testing regimen. It’s conceivable that at least some of them
will reason in the following way.
If people test positive, they will be sent home or told not to come to work. If
the PPV of the test is low, then there is a good chance that many of the people sent
home or told not to come to work won’t actually be positive. If someone tests
negative, they will be allowed to remain at or come to work. If this is done when
the NPV of the test is low, there is a good chance that many of the people allowed
to come to work, or remain there, will be infected. Which is worse: keeping people
home when they don’t really have the disease or allowing people to work when
they do? These are the kinds of questions employers, businesses, and even everyday
citizens/residents will have to think about; familiarity with Bayes’ theorem might
help them do so more carefully.
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Probability and COVID-19 with Natural Frequencies
The psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer (2002) is well known for his work on presenting
probabilities in terms of natural frequencies instead of percentages or proportions.
Everything from the previous section can be discussed in terms of such frequencies.
That is, everything can be discussed in terms of relationships between magnitudes
instead of percentages or proportions.
Let’s translate the first calculation from the previous section into natural
frequencies using Table 1 as a starting point. The entry at the top is the US
population of 329,400,000 people, and 554,849 of them have COVID-19. Of these
554,849, there are 549,301 (99% sensitivity) who tested positive for the disease,
while 5,548 people tested negative. Moving on, 328,845,151 of the 329,400,000
people in the United States do not have COVID-19. Out of these 328,845,151, there
are 3,288,452 (1% false positive probability) who tested positive for it, while
325,556,699 (99%) tested negative.
Recall that the positive predictive value of a test is the probability of actually
having the disease, given that one tested positive for it. Once natural frequencies
are presented, it becomes easy to figure this out. Start with the total number of
positive cases: 549,301 + 3,288,452 = 3,837,753. Since 549,301 of these positive
cases actually have COVID-19, if we divide 549,301 by 3,837,753, we obtain the
chance that someone has COVID-19, given that they tested positive for it—the PPV
of the test—which comes out to about 0.14 or 14%, which is the same we found in
the previous section using Bayes’ theorem.
Table 1
COVID-19 Cases and Infections in US
Population with Low Prevalence

Table 2
COVID-19 Cases and Infections in US
Population with Medium Prevalence

US Population

US Population

329,400,000

329,400,000

COVID-19

554,849

COVID-19

6,588,000

Positive

549,301

Positive

6,522,120

Negative
No COVID-19
Positive
Negative

5,548
328,845,151
3,288,452
325,556,699

Negative
No COVID-19
Positive
Negative

65,880
322,812,000
3,228,120
319,583,880

Natural frequencies can be used to gain insight into the other calculations from
the previous section. See Table 2 for the assumption that 6,588,000 folks in the US
population have COVID-19, while 322,812,000 of them don’t. To figure out the
PPV given these numbers, we divide 6,522,120 by (6,522,120 + 3,228,120). The
result is about 0.67 or 67%, the same as we found in the previous section.
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Table 3
COVID-19 Cases and Infections in US
Population with High Prevalence

A natural frequencies version of the third
calculation from the previous section can be
obtained by using Table 3. This time we
US Population
329,400,000
obtain the PPV by dividing 55,438,020 by
COVID-19
55,998,000
(55,438,020 + 2,734,020); the result is about
Positive
55,438,020
0.95 or 95%, just as we obtained in the
Negative
559,980
previous section.
No COVID-19
273,402,000
The use of natural frequencies doesn’t
Positive
2,734,020
provide any new information. It’s just a
Negative
270,667,980
different way of presenting the same
information, but one which may reduce the chance of mistakes. In his book
Calculated Risks, Gigerenzer (2002) provides a great deal of evidence indicating
that people have a hard time thinking in terms of Bayes’ theorem. He also provides
evidence that when folks think about Bayes’ theorem in terms of natural
frequencies, they tend to make fewer mistakes.

Probability and COVID-19 Testing with Venn
Diagrams
Another way to make Bayes’ theorem easier to understand is to use pictures,
specifically Venn Diagrams. Consider the Venn diagram Figure 1:

Figure 1. Venn diagram of possible cases for: Has COVID-19? Tested Positive? [1] Yes, Yes; [2] Yes, No;
[3] No, Yes; [4], No, No
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Now consider Bayes’ theorem again:
P(COVID-19│Positive) =
𝑃(Positive│COVID‐19)∗𝑃(COVID−19)
𝑃(Positive│COVID‐19)∗𝑃(COVID‐19)+𝑃(Positive│No COVID‐19)∗𝑃(No COVID‐19)

In Figure 1, the sum of areas 1, 2, 3, and 4 represent all US residents. The sum of
areas 1 and 2 represent all of those with COVID-19, the total of areas 1 and 3
represent all of those who tested positive for COVID-19, and area 1 represents all
those with COVID-19 who tested positive for the disease.
Here are the relevant probabilities for Bayes’ theorem stated in terms of the
Venn Diagram:
[1]

𝑃(COVID‐ 19|Positive) =
𝑃(Positive|COVID‐ 19) =
𝑃(Positive|No COVID‐ 19) =
𝑃(COVID‐ 19) =

[1]
[1]+[2]

[3]
[3]+[4]

[1]+[2]
[1]+[2]+[3]+[4]

𝑃(No COVID‐ 19) =
[1]

[1]+[3]

[1]+[2]

= PPV of the test

= sensitivity of test

= probability of a false positive

= Prevalence of the disease
[3]+[4]
[1]+[2]+[3]+[4]
[3]

[3]+[4]

[1]+[3]

𝑃(Positive) = [1]+[2] ∗ [1]+[2]+[3]+[4] + [3]+[4] ∗ [1]+[2]+[3]+[4] = [1]+[2]+[3]+[4]
In 𝑃(Positive), the expression after the second equality sign follows because
[1] + [2] and [1] + [3] in the expression after the first equality sign both cancel. We
can now plug all these quantities into Bayes’ theorem:
[1]
[1]+[3]
[1]

=

[1]
[1]+[2]
∗
[1]+[2] [1]+[2]+[3]+[4]
[1]+[3]
[1]+[2]+[3]+[4]

[1]+[2]

∗
∗
[1]+[2] [1]+[2]+[3]+[4]

=

[1]+[2]+[3]+[4]
[1]+[3]

The sums [1] + [2] and [1] + [2] + [3] + [4], after the second equality sign, both
cancel; so we’re left with

[1]
[1]+[3]

. Taking a look again at the Venn Diagram above,

we see that [1] + [3] are the folks who tested positive for COVID-19, while [1] are
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those who tested positive who actually have the disease. This means that

[1]
[1]+[3]

is

the proportion of those who tested positive who actually have the disease. That is,
[1]
[1]+[3]

is the positive predictive value of the test, which is exactly what we want.

Conclusion
As I write these lines in April of 2020, COVID-19 is wreaking havoc on the world.
Whether we’ll be able to control it will depend on good decision making, and good
decision making will depend on an understanding of probability theory, especially
Bayes’ theorem. This paper has been an attempt to graphically illustrate this point.
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